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A welfarist way of allocating resources consists in 1) equipping
individuals with comparable indices of their well-being and 2) ap-
plying a unique aggregation rule to individual well-being levels. An
equality of opportunity way of allocating resources consists in 1) mak-
ing the distinction between personal characteristics which are under
and beyond individuals’ control, and 2) decreasing inequalities due
to diﬀerences in characteristics beyond individuals’ control. We show
that under the proviso that indiﬀerent individuals should not inﬂu-
ence social judgements, welfarist and equal opportunity judgements
on resource allocation are equivalent.
1 Introduction
Two main ethical theories have the lead in welfare economics, welfarism and
equality of opportunity. Welfarism is the view that individual utilities are
all what matters for equitable decision making. Public decisions of resource
allocation should all be driven by their impact on individual utilities. Once
impacts on utilities are determined, collective choices are made on ground
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1of an aggegation rule of individual utilities. This aggregation rule does not
depend on the speciﬁcc h o i c et ob em a d e ,n o ro nt h es p e c i ﬁc utility functions
of the agents. Utilitarianism, for instance, is the welfarist theory where
aggregation is obtained by summing up individual utilities.
Welfarism is prevalent, for instance, in public economics, where optimal
taxation theory is built under the assumption that the social planner tries to
maximize a welfarist (usually utilitarian) social welfare function. There are
two main criticisms addressed towards welfarism. First, political philosophers
object against it that social justice cannot be stated in terms of individual
utilities. Rawls, in particular, has forcefully argued that taking utilities into
account conﬂicts with a view of human beings as autonomous moral agents
(see Rawls [20]). Second, welfarism also suﬀers from the fact that there is no
consensus among economists (nor among psychologist or any others) on how
to measure utilities. Public economists circumvent the latter diﬃculty by
stating that individual utilities should not necessarily reﬂect agents’ happi-
ness or satisfaction but, rather, they reﬂect the ethical choices of the planner,
that is, how the planner views the agents’ happiness or satisfaction.
Recently, theories of justice based on the idea that opportunities should
be equalized have been applied to economic issues. There are several com-
peting theories of equality of opportunity (see below, beginning of section
3). All agree that diﬀerences in agents’ outcomes come from diﬀerences in
characteristics they should be responsible for (e.g. because they control the
value taken by those characteristics) and diﬀerences in characteristics they
should not be responsible for. Equalizing opportunities consists of allocating
external, transferable resources in such a way that diﬀerences in the latter
characteristics, and only those diﬀerences, are eliminated. Those theories
diﬀer in how they deﬁne outcomes, and in where they put the cut between
characteristics that need to be counterbalanced, which we call here compen-
sation parameters, and characteristics which do not justify any intervention,
which we call responsibility parameters. Once outcomes are deﬁned and the
compensation/responsibility cut is chosen, theories also diﬀer with respect
to the way lists of (typically unequal) individual opportunity sets are com-
pared, that is, how individual opportunities are aggregated (see, e.g., Roemer
[22] and Bossert, Fleurbaey and Van de gaer [6], or Kranich [17], [18], and
Kranich and Ok [19]).
In this paper, we show equivalence between these two ethical theories.
More precisely, we prove that if a consistency condition is imposed then
any social welfare judgement based on the idea that opportunities should be
2equalized is equivalent to building individual utility functions and applying
a utility aggregation rule that only depends on the utility levels. Consis-
tency means that removing indiﬀerent agents does not inﬂuence the social
preference over suballocations. Consistency properties have been extensively
studied in game theory and the fair allocation literature (see Thomson [27]).
They are also reminiscent to separability conditions which are common in
welfare economics (see e. g. Fleming [11] and d’Aspremont and Gevers [8]).
The major aggregation rules encountered in social choice theory satisfy con-
sistency (like the utilitarian, leximin and Nash social welfare functions; see
below, section 3).
A natural question raised by this result is that of the informational basis
of those ethical theories. In particular, is it possible to construct utility func-
tions in the way suggested here by relying only on ordinal noncomparable
information on individual preferences, which is the only information revealed
by deterministic individual choices? We prove it is, provided individual pref-
erences are part of the responsibility parameters, that is, parameters for
which diﬀerences among individuals do not justify any compensation.
The main achievement of this paper is therefore that it opens a way for
solving the problem faced by welfarist social observers as of how to construct
utility functions in an ethically maeningful way. We show, indeed, that equal
opportunity requirements can be used to help perform this construction, even
by sticking to traditional ordinal non-comparable preferences, consistent with
revealed preferences.
The paper is organized as follows. We deﬁne the model in Section 2. We
introduce and justify our properties in Section 3. We state the equivalence
result in Section 4. We prove the compatibility between our approach and
ordinalism non-comparability in Section 5. We give all the proofs in Section
6, and we conclude in Section 7.
2M o d e l a n d n o t a t i o n s
We borrow the model from Fleurbaey [14]. It is the simplest model where
both equality of opportunity and welfarism make sense. There are variable
sets of agents drawn from the inﬁnite set of all possible populations N.F o r
a set of agents N ∈ N, each agent i ∈ N is characterized by two lists
of parameters (θic,θir) ∈ Θc × Θr. By convention, the list θic refers to the
parameters for which the society would like to compensate the agent, whereas
3the list θir refers to the parameters the value of which the agent should be
held responsible for.
The characterization of agents through two sets of parameters is necessary
to introduce equality of opportunity allocation ordering functions. Being able
to vary the value of these characteristics is necessary to deﬁne welfarism, and
we have chosen to vary those values by allowing the population to change, so
that an agent can be replaced by another agent with other characteristics.
Agents are likely to obtain amounts of resources. The set of possible
resources amounts is denoted X.A ne l e m e n txi ∈ X can be interpreted as
a bundle of goods, or, preferably, as a budget (or opportunity) set. Given
resources xi ∈ X and parameters (θci,θri) ∈ Θc×Θr,a g e n ti reaches outcome
O(xi,θci,θri) ∈ O.I t i s s u ﬃcient for our purpose to assume that O is a
partially ordered set. On the other hand, let us observe that function O :
X × Θc × Θr → O is not parameterized by any i ∈ N. This is consistent
with the fact that any parameter determining the relevant characteristics of
the agents are embodied in the θ’s.
Let us give two examples. Assume ﬁrst that we wish to equalize oppor-
tunities in the schooling system (such an analysis is carried out in Roemer
[22]). We may consider that students are not responsible for their genes, nor
for the socio-economic backgrounds of their parents, whereas they should be
accountable for their schooling eﬀorts. In this case, θic represents student
i’s genes and her parents’ characteristics, θir represents her schooling eﬀort,
measured, say, in hours of work, xi stands for the per student expenses of
the government in student i’s school, and O(xi,θci,θri) stands for the wage
rate, or the wage rate opportunity reached by i.
Assume, as a second example, that we study income taxation on the labor
market (no reform of the schooling system is possible). We may consider that
workers are not responsible for their wage opportunities, whereas they are
free to choose their (yearly, or lifetime) labor time (see the analyses in Bossert
[5], Fleurbaey and Maniquet [16] Bossert, Fleurbaey and Van de gaer [6] and
Sprumont [25]). Then we would have θic for the wage rate, θir for the labor
time, xi for the tax paid or subsidy received, and O(xi,θci,θri)f o r( a ni n d e x
of) the consumption level.
An economy is a set of agents N ∈ N, and a list of individual character-
istics. Formally, e =( N,θc,θr) ∈ E = N×∪N∈NΘN
c × ΘN
r .A n allocation
for an economy e =( N,θc,θr) ∈ E is a list x ∈ XN of individual resource
bundles. For an economy e =( N,θc,θr) ∈ E, the problem faced by the ethi-
cal planner is to order elements of XN as a function of the characteristics of
4the agents. As the set of agents is variable, an ethical theory can be repre-
sented by a resource allocation ordering function R whose domain is the set
of economies, E,a n ds u c ht h a tf o ra l le ∈ E, R(e) is a complete ranking on
XN.
We will restrict ourselves in this paper to problems where compensation
is possible, that is, where the amount of resources needed to equalize oppor-
tunities is always ﬁnite.
Assumption A: for all θci,θ
0





Even if this is a severe limitation (it is indeed likely that no ﬁnite amount
of money would lead any human in good health agree to become heavily
handicapped), it is legitimate to raise the question of compensation only
when nature does not exclude by itself the possibility of compensating (as it
is the case, for instance, in the two examples above).
3 Properties
In this Section, we give the formal deﬁnitions of the ethical theories we are
interested in. Our deﬁnitions will be axiomatic. We will begin with equality
of opportunity, which is not as well known among economists as welfarism.
“There is, in the notion of equality of opportunity, a ‘before’ and an
‘after’: before the competition starts, opportunities must be equalized, by
social intervention if need be, but after it begins, individuals are on their
own” (Roemer [22], p2). Let us call the ’before’ principle of compensation,
and the ’after’ principle of responsibility.
There are three branches of economic literature on equality of opportu-
nity. They diﬀer in several respects. First, they do not all give the same
emphasis on the responsibility principle. Second, they do not use the same
method of justiﬁcation to their proposals. Some are axiomatic, some are
not. Third, the extent to which they have led to applications varies from one
another.
The ﬁrst branch of literature, initiated by Roemer [21], directly addresses
the question of the deﬁnition of the social optimum, in the social welfare
function tradition. Another key feature of the approach is that the part
of an individual’s outcome for which she is responsible is deﬁned as her
precise place in the statistical distribution of outcomes among agents of the
5same type (see [28]). This approach has led to various applications, studying
for instance how to ﬁnance the schooling system or the health system (see
Roemer [22]).
The second branch, initiated by Fleurbaey [12] and Bossert [5], tries to de-
ﬁne the social optimum axiomatically, and focusses on the possible dilemma
between the principles of compensation and responsibility. The approach has
been applied to health care insurance system (see Schokkaert, Dhaene and
Van de Voorde [23]) and minimum income (see Fleurbaey, Hagnere, Martinez
and Trannoy [15]).
The third one, initiated by Kranich [17], concentrates on the compensa-
tion principle, and axiomatically develops ways to measure the degrees of
achievements of the compensation goals. To the best of our knowledge, it
has not yet given rise to empirical applications.
We begin by stating properties which allocation ordering functions should
satisfy if they are to capture the equality of opportunity ethics. Given the
diﬀerent theoretical developments of the s ei d e a si nt h ee c o n o m i cl i t e r a t u r e ,
our strategy is to deﬁne weak properties which may pretend to be at the
intersection of all three main branches of the literature. All those properties
are inspired by the indiﬀerence version of Suppes’ grading principles (Sup-
pes [26], Sen [24]), and, therefore, they are consistent with any degree of
inequality aversion. The ﬁrst property, called Compensation, requires that
permuting the outcome levels of two agents having the same responsibil-
ity parameters but possibly diﬀerent compensation parameters leads to two
socially equivalent allocations. The justiﬁcation is clear: as those agents
have the same responsibility parameters, society should treat the outcomes
of those two agents anonymously; if outcomes are permuted, then we obtain
an equally good, or equally bad, allocation.
Compensation:f o r a l l e =( N,θc,θr) ∈ E, j,k ∈ N such that θrj = θrk,
x0,x 0 ∈ XN such that xi = x0




It will be suﬃcient in some cases below to focus on the following much
weaker property. It oﬀers a similar requirement as that above but restricted
to the cases where the agents’ responsibility parameters are equal to some
reference parameter ˜ θr ∈ Θr.
Minimal Compensation:t h e r ee x i s t s˜ θr ∈ Θr such that for all e =( N,θc,θr) ∈
E, j,k ∈ N such that θrj = θrk = ˜ θr, x,x0 ∈ XN such that xi = x0





The two next properties are consistent with the idea that society should
counterbalance diﬀerences in compensation parameters only. That is, if two
agents diﬀer only in terms of their responsibility parameters, society should
treat them indiﬀerently, so that their respective outcomes reﬂect the diﬀer-
ences in the parameters they control. The third property, called Responsibil-
ity, requires that permuting the bundles of two agents having the same com-
pensation parameters but possibly diﬀerent responsibility parameters leads
to two socially equivalent allocations. Again, the justiﬁcation is clear: as
those agents have the same compensation parameters, society should treat
the resources allocated to those two agents anonymously. By permuting re-
source bundles, we obtain an equally good, or equally bad, allocation.
Responsibility:f o r a l l e =( N,θc,θr) ∈ E, j,k ∈ N such that θcj = θck,
x,x0 ∈ XN such that xi = x0
i for all i 6= j,k:i fxj = x0
k and x0
j = xk,t h e n
xI(e)x0.
It will also prove suﬃcient in some cases below to focus on a weaker
property, obtained by restricting the above requirement to the cases where
the agents’ compensation parameters are equal to some reference parameter
˜ θc ∈ Θc.
Minimal Responsibility: there exists ˜ θc ∈ Θc such that for all e =( N,θc,θr) ∈
E, j,k ∈ N such that θcj = θck = ˜ θc, x,x0 ∈ XN such that xi = x0
i for all
i 6= j,k:i fxj = x0
k and x0
j = xk,t h e nxI(e)x0.
Resource should be allocated to equalize opportunities. Consequently,
resource bundles only matter inasmuch as they allow agents to reach high
outcome levels. The crucial parameters which the planner should look at to
compare allocations should not be the resource bundles as such but agents’
outcomes. This is captured by the following Social Indiﬀerence property. It
requires that two allocations leading the same outcome to each agent should
be deemed equivalent. It is reminiscent to the usual Pareto Indiﬀerence prop-
erty. Recall that we did not introduce preferences explicitly in our setting.
Social Indiﬀerence:f o ra l le =( N,θc,θr) ∈ E, x,x0 ∈ XN,i fO(xi,θci,θri)=
O(x0
i,θci,θri)f o ra l li ∈ N, then xI(e)x0.
We consider that the ﬁve axioms deﬁned so far are the cornerstone of
equality of opportunity. Any particular theory could, of course, be more de-
7manding about either the compensation or the responsibility principle, but
the ideas captured in those principles must be part of any speciﬁct h e o r y .
At the generality level of the model we study here, however, the existence of
social ordering functions satisfying Compensation and Responsibility is not
guaranteed (thereby illustrating the trade-oﬀ analysed in the second branch
of the literature presented above), so that we will restrict ourselves to com-
bining either principle with the minimal version of the other.
This paper is aimed at studying the relationship between recent theories
of equality of opportunity and welfarism, the long since dominating theory
in welfare economics. It is essential here to distinguish between two diﬀerent
traditions in welfarist ethics. Of course, all welfarists agree that collective
choice should be a matter of welfare aggregation, but not all welfarists agree
on what welfare refers to.
In the ﬁrst tradition, welfare refers to some subjective appraisal of one’s
own well-being (see e. g., Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson [3]). In the
second tradition, welfare is not necessarily a subjective notion but can refer
to any a priori comparable indices of individual well-being (see d’Aspremont
and Gevers [9]). These indices are commonly interpreted as utility functions
representing individual preferences, but may as well be summaries of indi-
viduals’ doings and beings, or life expectancy, etc. That is, welfarism, in the
latter tradition, is a ﬂexible ethical theory, as it can be used to aggregate
any kind of well-being indicators. But, as a consequence, it is an incomplete
theory, as it does not tell the ethical observer how to construct those indica-
tors. This paper is an attempt to complement this tradition with an ethically
meaningful theory of how to construct welfare indicators.
We now proceed by recalling the deﬁnition of welfarism (see e.g. d’Aspremont
and Gevers [9]).
A utility function is a function u : X → R. The set of all utility functions
is denoted U.Autility representation of the outcome function is a function
u.. : Θc × Θr → U such that for all (θc,θr) ∈ Θc × Θr,a n dx,x0 ∈ X:
[O(x,θc,θr) ≥ O(x
0,θc,θr)] ⇔ [uθc,θr(x) ≥ uθc,θr(x
0)].
A social welfare ordering for N ∈ N is a complete ordering on RN.Asocial
welfare ordering function, denoted R, associates to each N ∈ N an ordering
R(N)o nRN.





8where for all i ∈ N, ui = uθic,θir(xi)a n du0
i = uθic,θir(x0
i)a n dR is said to be
associated to R.
We will restrict our attention to welfarist ordering functions that are min-
imally equitable in the sense of anonymity. It is clear that any defendable
ethical theory satisﬁes this requirement. Anonymity requires that the names
of the agents do not matter in social judgements, that is, if two agents per-
mute their utility levels, then the social welfare ranking remains unaﬀected.
For N ∈ N,l e tΠN denote the set of all permutations of N.
Anonymityw:f o r a l l N ∈ N, u,u0 ∈ RN and π ∈ ΠN:i f uR(N)u0 then
π(u)R(N)π(u0).
Our main result, stated in the following Section, establishes the equiv-
alence between the two theories we are interested in, provided they satisfy
some cross-economy consistency requirement.1 The next axiom is a natural
adaptation in our framework of the consistency property which has been ex-
tensively studied in game theory and the fair allocation literature (see Thom-
son [27]). Consistency works like this. If an allocation is socially as good
as another, and if a subset of agents are assigned exactly the same resource
bundles in both allocations, then removing those agents with their resources
should not change the social preference, that is, the suballocation obtained
from the ﬁrst allocation by removing those agents should still be as good for
the subeconomy as the allocation obtained from the second allocation.
Consistency: for all e =( N,θc,θr) ∈ E, M ⊂ N,x,x0 ∈ XN, if xi = x0
i for all
i ∈ N \ M,t h e n
xR(e) x




0 ⇒ xM P (M,θcM,θrM) x
0
M.
Consistency properties in the same spirit as this property have been ex-
tensively studied in the equality of opportunity literature. Unfortunately,
Consistency, as we deﬁne it in this paper, is not compatible with the ap-
proach proposed be Roemer, as removing agents from an economy aﬀects the
1Readers familiar with the axiomatic approach may have noticed that all the equality
of opportunity requirements are single proﬁle requirements, whereas welfarism is multi-
proﬁle. A comparison is therefore possible only if some inter proﬁle requirement is added.
Consistency is such a requirement, although a very weak one.
9relative place in the outcome distribution of others2 (recall that in Roemer’s
approach, an agent is responsible for her place in the statistical distribution
of outcomes among agents of the same type). On the other hand, there is no
diﬃculty in combining Consistency with the other two approaches to equality
of opportunity.3
A welfarist social welfare ordering function satisﬁes Consistency if and
only if the social welfare ordeing function which is associated to it satisﬁes
the following Consistencyw axiom.
Consistencyw:f o ra l lN ∈ N, M ⊂ N,u,u0 ∈ RN, if ui = u0
i for all i ∈ N\M,
then
uR(N) u




0 ⇒ uM P (M) u
0
M.
If social welfare is deﬁned as the sum (utilitarianism) or the product (the
Nash social welfare function) or the leximin (the so-called Rawlsian social
welfare function) of agents’ utilities, then the resulting social welfare ordering
function satisﬁes Consistencyw. Generalized Gini social welfare orderings, on
the other hand, do not satisfy this property (see, e. g., Blackorby, Bossert
and Donaldson [2]).
The consistency property deﬁned above looks similar to separability con-
ditions that are encountered in welfare economics and the theory of social
choice (see Fleming [11] and d’Aspremont and Gevers [8]). The separability
conditions, with some variations, state that agents who are indiﬀerent over
some alternatives should not inﬂuence social preferences over those alter-
natives. Our condition says that removing those agents from the economy
should not alter social preferences.
2As it does not satisfy Consistency, applying the Roemer proposal to the school funding
system, for instance, will lead diﬀerent results if, say, the relative funding of schools A and
B are computed as part of a City or a State policy. This may be viewed as a weakness of
that approach.
3Regarding the second branch of literature, Consistency is studied in e. g. Fleurbaey
[13]. As of the third branch, Consistency is compatible with e. g. the cardinality based
approach of Ok and Kranich [19].
104T h e r e s u l t
We are now equipped to prove our main result. It is an equivalence result
between two seemingly unrelated equity theories. If an allocation ordering
function is consistent with the goal of equalizing opportunities in the sense
of satisfying properties of compensation and responsibility as stated in the
previous section and satisﬁes Consistency, then it is welfarist. Conversely,
given any welfarist way of aggregating utility levels, there exists a way of con-
structing utility functions such that the resulting ordering function equalizes
opportunities in the sense above.
There are two ways of stating this result, depending on which of the
equal opportunity requirements we emphasize (recall that the existence of
allocation ordering functions satisfying Compensation and Responsibility is
not guaranteed in our model). Indeed, we can either combine Compensation
and Minimal Responsibility, or Minimal Compensation and Responsibility.
This gives us the following theorems.
Theorem 1 Under Assumption A, if an allocation ordering function R sat-
isﬁes Social Indiﬀerence, Compensation, Minimal Responsibility and Consis-
tency, then it is Welfarist and the real vector ordering function R associated
to it satisﬁes Anonymityw and Consistencyw.
Theorem 2 F o re a c hr e a lv e c t o ro r d e r i n gf u n c t i o nR satisfying Anonymityw,
there exists a Welfarist allocation ordering function R satisfying Social In-
diﬀerence, Compensation and Minimal Responsibility.
We give the proof of those statements in Section 6. Let us, here, explain
in words why equality of opportunity turns out to be equivalent to welfarism.
Let us start with any given economy. It is well-known in this case that any
allocation ordering satisfying Social Indiﬀerence can be represented as a social
welfare ordering (see e. g. Blackorby, Donaldson and Weymark [4]). This is
called in the literature single proﬁle welfarism, and it is a well-known fact that
if parameters are not allowed to change, that is, if the ethical observer is not
required to be consistent in her judgement over diﬀerent economies, then she
is always a welfarist. This ﬁrst step is no more than a technical representation
a n di th a sn o t h i n gt od ow i t ht h er e q u i r e m e n tt h a ts o c i a lw e l f a r eo r d e r i n g sb e
independent of the particular utility functions that create the utility levels.
But the key feature of the equality of opportunity properties is that they
allow us to extend this single proﬁle welfarism into welfarism. This comes
11from the fact that equality of opportunity combines two orthogonal require-
ments, one on compensation parameters and the other one on responsibility
parameters. Moreover, Consistency imposes robustness across orderings in
diﬀerent economies, so that the restriction on the ordering in one society
contaminates the orderings in the others.
Let us illustrate these facts. Let us consider a two-agent economy ({1,2},
(θc1,θc2), (θr1,θr2)) where individual characteristics are diﬀerent. None of
our compensation and responsibility properties seem to have any bite on
this economy. However, our social evaluation need to be consistent with,
say, economy ({1,2,3},( θc1,θc2,θc3), (θr1,θr2,θr3) )w h e r ew ec a na s s u m e
that θc3 = θc1 and θr3 = θr2. In that economy, a compensation property
imposes restriction on the pair {2,3}, and a responsibility property on the
pair {1,3}. Moreover, the social evaluation in the initial economy also needs
to be consistent with that in economy ({1,2,4},( θc1,θc2,θc4), (θr1,θr2,θr4))
where θc4 = θc2 and θr4 = θr1. Now, compensation imposes a restriction on
the pair {1,4} and responsibility on the pair {2,4}. As it turns out, those
cross economies restrictions are so severe that once the allocation ordering
is ﬁxed for one arbitrary economy, there is only one consistent ordering for
any other economy, thereby extending single proﬁle welfarism into welfarism.
The two versions of the result simply states that combining Compensation
and Minimal Responsibility or Minimal Compensation and Responsibility
respectively is suﬃcient to determine the required initial allocation ordering
in some speciﬁce c o n o m y .
Theorem 3 Under Assumption A, if an allocation ordering function R sat-
isﬁes Social Indiﬀerence, Minimal Compensation, Responsibility and Consis-
tency, then it is Welfarist and the real vector ordering function R associated
to it satisﬁes Anonymity and Consistencyw.
Theorem 4 F o re a c hr e a lv e c t o ro r d e r i n gf u n c t i o nR satisfying Anonymityw,
there exists a Welfarist allocation ordering function R satisfying Social In-
diﬀerence, Minimal Compensation and Responsibility.
The proof of the last theorems parallels the proof of the previous ones
and will be omitted.
125 Ordinalism non-comparability
We now turn to the question of the informational basis of the ethical theories
we have been studying. Which measurability and comparability assumption
do we have to impose on preferences to be able to construct equal opportu-
nity or welfarist social ordering functions? We prove in this Section that all
the results that have been stated up to now are compatible with the weak-
est informational assumptions on preferences. Indeed, constructing utility
functions in a way consistent with Theorems 1 and 3 is possible even with
only ordinal non-comparable information on preferences, provided the pa-
rameters determining agents’ utility functions are part of the responsibility
parameters. The latter proviso is advocated by some political philosophers
(see Rawls [20], Dworkin [10]).
Throughout this section, we consider that outcomes are actually utility
levels. That is, we ﬁx O ⊆ R (recall that O is the image set of outcome
function) so that O(xi,θic,θir) stands for the utility level reached by an agent
i having parameters θic,θir and being assigned resources xi. Society considers
that agents are responsible for their utility function, that is, what determines
agents’ utility functions is part of their responsibility parameters. For the
sake of simplicity, we will assume that the responsibility parameters gather
all and only what makes utility functions diﬀer from one agent to another.
We will come back to this assumption at the end of the section.
A resource allocation ordering function satisﬁes Ordinalism Non-Comparability
whenever the rankings of the allocations only depend on the individual rank-
ings and not on the utility levels they reach. That is, if the utility function
of an agent changes so that her new function is simply obtained by a strictly
increasing transformation of her ﬁrst one, then the social ranking should not
change.
Ordinalism Non-Comparability: for all e =( N,θc,θr),∈ E, j ∈ N,θ
0
rj ∈ Θr if











Our second result is that the properties required in the previous section
are compatible with Ordinalism Non-Comparability.
13Theorem 5 If an allocation ordering function R satisﬁes Responsibility and
Consistency, then it satisﬁes Ordinalism Non-Comparability.
If Responsibility is replaced with Minimal Responsibility,t h e nw ew o u l d
only obtain Ordinalism Non-Comparability for agents having the reference
parameter e θr. Nonetheless, if Compensation is added, then, by the same kind
of argument as in the previous section, we can widespread this result to all
other responsibility parameters.
Let us come back to the assumption that the whole list of responsibility
parameters determine agents’ utility function. Let us now assume, instead,
that there are two lists of parameters, respectively θr and θu whereas only
θu enters the deﬁnition of the utility function. Responsibility would still be
stated with the proviso that θcj = θck,a n dOrdinalism Non-Comparability








It is clear that the statement just proven would hold a fortiori. So it is
suﬃcient that the parameters determining the utility function be part of
what society would like to hold agents responsible for.
6P r o o f s
We begin this proof section by stating and proving an important consequence
of the Consistency property.
Lemma 1 If a social ordering function R satisﬁes Consistency,t h e ni ts a t -
isﬁes the following property: for all e =( N,θc,θr),e 0 =( M,θcM,θrM) ∈ E,
such that N ∩ M = ∅,x , x 0 ∈ XN and y ∈ X|M|: xR(e)x0 if and only if
(x,y)R(e,e0)(x0,y).
Proof. Suppose the claim is wrong, so that, for instance, xR(e)x0
whereas (x0,y)P(e,e0)(x,y)( as i m l a ra r g u m e n tw o r k si nt h ec a s exP(e)x0
whereas (x0,y)I(e,e0)(x,y)). By Consistency,( x0,y)P(e,e0)(x,y)i m p l i e s
x0 P(e)x, a contradiction which proves the claim.
146.1 Theorem 1
Proof. Let R satisfy the axioms. Let e θc be a compensation parameter
value for which R satisﬁes Minimal Responsibility.L e t u s ﬁx N ∈ N.L e t
θ
∗
r ∈ Θr be any responsibility parameter value. Let us deﬁne the economy




r)) ∈ N.B y Social Indiﬀerence,w ec a nu s e
Propositions 1 and 2 in Blackorby, Donaldson and Weymark [4], so that
there exist a social welfare ordering, say R,o nRN, and a utility function,




where for all i ∈ N, ui = u(xi)a n du0
i = u(x0









r)] ⇔ [u(x) ≥ u(x
0)].
By Compensation,f o ra l lπ ∈ ΠN, xI(e e)π(x)a n dx0 I(e e)π(x0). Therefore,
uRu0 ⇔ π(u)Rπ(u0), and R satisﬁes Anonymityw.
Step 1: construction of u...
For all x ∈ X,l e tue θcθr(x) ≡ u(x). For all θc ∈ Θc, by Assumption A, for
all e x ∈ X, there exists x ∈ X such that O(x,θc,θr)=O(e x,e θc,θr). Let uθc,θr
be deﬁned by: for all x ∈ X,
uθc,θr(x)=u(e x) ⇔ O(x,θc,θr)=O(e x,e θc,θr).
Finally, for all θ
0
r ∈ Θr, uθ0
c,θr be deﬁned by: for all x ∈ X,
uθc,θ0
r(x)=uθc,θr(x).
Step 2: R is Welfarist




where for all i ∈ N, ui = uθic,θir(xi)a n du0
i = uθic,θir(x0
i). Let N0 ∈ N be
such that |N| = |N0| so that there exists a bijection β : N → N0.L e te0 =
(N0,(e θc,...,e θc),θ
0




rβ(i)(yβ(i))=ui and ue θc,θ0
rβ(i)(y0
β(i))=u0






























r)). Let e x,e x0 ∈ XN be deﬁned by
for all i ∈ N, e xi = yβ(i) and e x0
i = y0
β(i). By Consistency and Lemma 1,
y R(e
0)y
























0 ⇔ e xR(e e)e x
0.
Now, we know that
e xR(e e)e x
0 ⇔ e uRe u
0
where for all i ∈ N, e ui = ue θic,θ∗
ir(e xi)a n de u0
i = ue θic,θ∗
ir(e x0
i). By construction,
for all i ∈ N,uθic,θir(xi)=ue θic,θ∗













Proof. Let us ﬁxs o m ee θc ∈ Θc.L e tu.. be some utility representation of O
satisfying the following properties: for all θc ∈ Θc,θr,θ
0










where for all i ∈ N, ui = uθic,θir(xi)a n du0
i = uθic,θir(x0
i). By construction, R
is Welfarist. We prove that it satisﬁes the axioms.
1) Social Indiﬀerence: It comes directly from the fact that, by Welfarism, R
does not discriminate between allocations yielding the same utility vector.
2) Compensation:L e tu st a k ea n ye =( N,θc,θr) ∈ E, j,k ∈ N such that
θrj = θrk, x,x0 ∈ XN such that xi = x0






where for all i ∈ N, ui = uθic,θir(xi)a n du0
i = uθic,θir(x0




3) Minimal Responsibility:L e tu st a k ea n ye =( N,θc,θr) ∈ E, j,k ∈ N such
that θcj = θck = ˜ θc,a n da n yx,x0 ∈ XN such that xi = x0
i for all i 6= j,k
and xj = x0
k and x0
j = xk. By construction of u.., ue θc,θri(x)=ue θc,θrj(x)a n d
ue θc,θri(x0)=ue θc,θrj(x0). By Anonymity of R,
uI(N)u
0
where for all i ∈ N, ui = uθic,θir(xi)a n du0
i = uθic,θir(x0






We ﬁrst need an additional deﬁnition and a lemma. Anonymity requires that
the names of the agents do not matter in social judgements, that is, if two
agents permute their parameters, then the social ranking remains unaﬀected
provided the resources allocated to those agents are also permuted.






















k such that x00
j = xk,x 00



































Lemma 2 If an allocation ordering function R satisﬁes Responsibility,a n d
Consistency, then it satisﬁes Anonymity.
Proof. Let e =( N,θc,θr),∈ E,x,x 0 ∈ XN be such that
xR(e)x
0.









k , xl, xm, x0
l, x0
m be deﬁned by
θ
0
j = θm ≡ θk,
θ
0
k = θl ≡ θj,
x
00
j = xm ≡ xk,
x
00















For the sake of convenience, let us deﬁne M = N\{j,k},N0 = N\{j,k} ∪













































































































































Proof. (of Theorem 5.1) By Lemma 2, R satisﬁes Anonymity.L e te =
(N,θc,θr),∈ E,j∈ N,θ
0
rj ∈ Θr, be such that there exists a strictly increasing








Let x,x0 ∈ XN be such that
xR(e)x
0.





Let k/ ∈ N,θck ∈ Θc,θrk,θ
0
rk ∈ Θr,x k,x 0





rj,x k = xj and x0
k = x0
j. By Consistency and Lemma 1,
(x,x
0












































197C o n c l u s i o n
We have shown in this paper that there is an equivalence between two seem-
ingly unrelated, if not opposed, families of resource allocation ordering func-
tions. The ﬁrst family of functions, which we consider consistent with modern
equal opportunity theories, satisfy properties of compensation and responsi-
bility. The second family of functions are the welfarist functions. We have
shown that among the ordering functions satisfying Consistency,e a c hm e m -
ber of the ﬁrst family was also a member of the second one, and vice versa.
We would like to emphasize again that allocation ordering functions as
deﬁned here can be constructed without making use of cardinal or comparable
information on preferences. This comes from the fact that the welfarist
ordering functions we deal with here, are not based on the assumption that
utility functions are intrinsically related to the human nature. Instead, utility
functions are assumed to be constructed by social observers, and, precisely,
the observers we were interested in are equal opportunity advocates. This is
why it is possible to be welfarist and still use only ordinal non-comparable
information on individual preferences.
There are several consequences to draw from our results. Maybe the main
lesson is that welfarism is far from being an obsolete ethical theory. More-
over, welfare economists can do more than letting the social planner construct
the utility respresentation of agents’ preferences. Indeed, the social planner
should only be asked to choose the cut between compensation and respon-
sibility parameters, and the aggregation process of individual opportunity
indicators. Welfare economists should then be able to compute, for instance,
optimal tax shemes, in a similar way as it is currently done in public eco-
nomics. If, in addition, the social planner considers individual preferences
as part of the responsibility parameters, then all the information needed to
compute the optimal allocation can be extracted from agents’ choices. The
results persented here should therefore yield new approaches to the design of
optimal social policies.
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